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Abstract
We consider a reasonably simple voting system which can be implemented for web-
based ballots. Simplicity, modularity and the requirement of compatibility with current
web browsers leads to a system which satisfies a set of security requirements for a ballot
system which is not complete but sufficient in many cases. Due to weak-eligibility and
vote-selling, this system cannot be used for political or similar ballots.
1 Introduction
Most of current (commercial) web-based voting, balloting or polling system include
little if no real security, in particular concerning privacy of the voter. Ballots are
collected on a web site and stored in a database. Privacy of the voter is often
guaranteed only as far as the vote is recorded in the database independently of the
voting credentials. Indeed some commercial services have warnings that the system
administrators can learn what every voter has voted for.
Here we present a simple, modular protocol, based on sound and common cryp-
tography and previous results in the literature [1, 2] which can be implemented
as a web service compatible with current web browsers and not requiring any user
education. Most of the cryptographic operations required in the protocol can be
implemented with common tools like PGP or gnupg [3].
Our system does not satisfy all requirements for a complete voting system, for
example it is possible to sell a vote, and for this reason it is not suitable for political
election and in general in all cases in which are requested some of the properties
that our system does not satisfies. For this reason we prefer not to call it a voting
system but only a balloting system. We do not call it either a polling system in
which results are statistical, since our protocol guarantees that each vote is counted
correctly and each eligible voter can cast her ballot.
In section 3 we list which requirements are satisfied by our system and which
are not. In section 4 we describe our protocol, in section 5 we discuss how the
security requirements are satisfied and in section 6 we discuss some threats and
countermeasures.
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In Appendix A we describe a variation of the protocol which uses blind signatures
[4, 2].
In a companion paper [5], we discuss how to implement our protocol in practice
in its simplest version.
2 Preliminaries
We start by indicating the components of our protocol. There are 6 human roles,
who have well precise duties. As we will see, some aspects of the security of the
protocol are based on the separation of duties among the managers of the system.
The 6 roles are:
1. the Voter: no request is made on the Voter, except to be able to use a common
web browser and in some cases to install a piece software on her own machine
2. the Authentication Managers (AuthMgr) must organize the ballot selecting
the eligible voters and providing them with the voting credentials; at the end
of the voting period they must check that only eligible voters have casted a
ballot
3. the Managers of the Authentication Web Server (AuthSysMgr) must setup and
run the Authentication Web Server and provide the AuthMgr with the list of
voters that have casted a ballot at the end of the voting period
4. the Managers of the Anonymizer System (AnonSysMgr) must guarantee that
all connections to the Vote Web Server do not leak information on the IP
address of the voter computer
5. the Vote Managers (VoteMgr) must count the votes at the end of the voting
period and announce the result of the ballot
6. the Managers of the Vote Web Server (VoteSysMgr) must setup and run the
Vote Web Server and provide, at the end of the voting period, the VoteMgr
with the encrypted votes that have been casted.
Moreover, the system is divided in 4 modules
1. the Voter (or Client): this is the voter machine and software, for example a
personal computer with a web browser and in case a local specialized proxy
2. the Authentication Server (AuthSrv) verifies the credentials of each voter and
gives to the voter a Authentication Token (called VoteAuthorization) which
allows the voter to cast her ballot
3. the Anonymizer renders all accesses to the Vote Server anonymous
4. the Vote Server (VoteSrv) allows the voter to cast only once the ballot in an
anonymous way.
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3 Requirements
Some requirements often used in defining an electronic voting system are:
1. Unreusability (prevent double voting): no voter can vote twice
2. Privacy: nobody can get any information about the voter’s vote
3. Completeness: all valid votes should be counted correctly
4. Soundness: any invalid vote should not be counted
5. Individual verifiability: each eligible voter can verify that her vote was counted
correctly
6. Weak Eligibility: only eligible voters can get voting credentials from trusted
authorities
7. Eligibility: no one who is not allowed to vote can vote
8. Fairness: nothing can affect the voting
9. Robustness: the voting system should be successful regarding of partial failure
of the system
10. Universal Verifiability: anyone can verify the fact that the election is fair and
the published tally is correctly computed from the ballots that were correctly
casted
11. Incoercibility: a voter cannot be coerced into casting a particular vote by a
coercer
12. Receipt-freeness: a voter neither obtains nor is able to construct a receipt
proving the content of her vote.
Our system satisfies only the first 6 requirements. In particular it does not
satisfies Eligibility (only Weak Eligibility) nor Receipt-freeness, both of which mean
that a voter is able to prove to someone else how she has voted, and so to sell her
vote.
4 The modular protocol
We describe now at high level the protocol and its components following the proce-
dure of a ballot.
4.1 Step 1 – Distribution of credentials
This step is done off-line. The Authentication Managers provide the voters with
the voting credentials:
1. a username+password and/or SSL/TLS client certificate which can be reused
or shared among various voters and which allows the voters to be authenticated
at the AuthSrv
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2. a VoteToken1 (a PseudoRandom-string) unique for each voter and for each
ballot, which can be used only once
3. the SSL/TLS fingerprints of the web SSL/TLS certificates of the AuthSrv and
VoteSrv.
For higher security the username+password (and/or client certificate) and Vote-
Token should be distributed using different communication channels.
4.2 Step 2 – the Voter
In principle the Voter can access the balloting system with one of the following
systems listed in increasing security. In the practical implementation of the protocol
only one of the following must be used by all voters in the same ballot, that is before
the ballot it must be decided which one of them the voters must use. The possible
voter’s systems are:
• a standard SSL/TLS web browser
• a standard web browser and a client proxy: the client proxy is an application
which runs on the voter’s machine, receives http requests from the voter web
browser, anonymizes the requests and connects securely to the AuthSrv and
VoteSrv
• a purpose built https client: in practice a reduced version of a SSL/TLS web
browser dedicated only to this purpose which includes the features both of the
web browser and of the client proxy
• a purpose built hardware device: (for example something similar to a smart-
phone or handheld device) in this case the hardware, the operating system and
the browser are custom made.
4.3 Step 3 – Authentication Server
The AuthSrv is a secure web server running an application able to implement the
protocol which will be presented below. The AuthSrv, managed by the AuthSysMgr,
needs to have:
1. the public key of the AuthMgr
2. its own private/public key certificate used to establish the SSL/TLS session
with the voter’s browser
3. its private/public key to digitally sign the VoteAuthorizations (see below)
4. the public key of the VoteSrv to encrypt the VoteAuthorizations
5. the list of username+password and/or client certificates
6. the list of valid VoteTokens.
The authentication procedure is the following:
1This is also called a Secret Token to stress the role of this credential.
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1. the voter connects to the AuthSrv with her web browser, checks the fingerprints
of the server digital certificate and is authenticated using username+password
and/or client digital certificate; finally the voter submits her VoteToken to the
AuthSrv
2. the AuthSrv checks that the VoteToken has not been used and creates a unique
PRN (Pseudo-Random-Number) called the VoteAuthorization and optionally
a short PIN (see below)
3. the AuthSrv digitally signs and encrypts with the VoteSrv public key the
VoteAuthorization (if the PIN is used, this is added to the VoteAuthorization
before encryption)
4. the AuthSrv records that the VoteToken has been used (for example by sign-
ing and encrypting it together with the current time and username with the
AuthMgr public key and writing it to a file with the same name)
5. the AuthSrv sends to the voter’s web browser the signed and encrypted VoteAu-
thorization. If the PIN is used, it is also sent to the voter not encrypted; the
PIN must not be stored by the client-proxy nor forwarded automatically in
clear to the VoteSrv, but only shown by the browser to the voter who should
record it off-line; notice that the PIN is also included in the encrypted VoteAu-
thorization.
The PIN could be useful if the vote phase (step 5 below) is done at a later
time than the authorization phase (this step 3). In this case the voter must store
the VoteAuthorization somewhere: the voter can write the VoteAuthorization on a
piece of paper or, more likely, store it as a file on the computer either directly or in
the client-proxy. In this second case there is the risk that someone else can access
the voter computer, find the VoteAuthorization and use it. If a PIN is used and
the voter has saved off-line the short PIN when has received the VoteAuthorization,
then a third person will not be able to use the stolen VoteAuthorization.
4.4 Step 4 – Anonymizer
The VoteSrv must not know nor be able to discover who is voting. Notice that
if the voter uses a normal web browser some information, like the contents of the
UserAgent field, are sent to the VoteSrv.
Since the connection between the voter and the VoteSrv is encrypted using
SSL/TLS, the contents can be anonymized only by the client itself for example
by the client-proxy.
But also the IP packets reaching the VoteSrv must be anonymized so not to
disclose the IP address of the voter machine. This can be done in various ways of
which we list some here in increasing security:
1. a NAT or double-NAT device: in this way all packets will reach the VoteSrv
with the same source address
2. a Crowd scheme [6]
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3. a Chaum mixer [7]
4. Tor [8] or similar scheme [9].
The Manager of the Anonymizer must choose a anonymizer system in relation to
the requirements of the ballot. Notice that some anonymizing schemes can introduce
very large delays in the traveling of the IP packets, making it almost impossible to
vote in real time, but giving higher guarantees of truly anonymize the traffic.
4.5 Step 5 – Vote Server
The VoteSrv is a secure web server with an application able to implement the
protocol which will be presented below. The VoteSrv, managed by the VoteSysMgr,
needs to have
1. the public key of the AuthMgr
2. the public key of the VoteMgr
3. its own private/public key certificate used to establish the SSL/TLS session
with the voter’s web browser
4. its private/public key to sign the Votes (see below).
The procedure to vote is the following:
1. the voter connects with her browser to the VoteSrv through the anonymizer
and checks the fingerprints of the digital certificate of the VoteSrv used for the
SSL/TLS session
2. the VoteSrv sends the Web Form to cast the ballot to the voter (if the PIN is
required, this is requested in the Form)
3. the voter casts her ballot and sends to the VoteSrv the Form filled-in and the
VoteAuthorization (this is usually done automatically by the browser or the
client-proxy which has stored the VoteAuthorization for the voter)
4. the VoteSrv decrypts the VoteAuthorization and checks the signature of the
AuthSrv, checks that the VoteAuthorization has not been already used and
that the optional PIN given by the voter in the submitted Form matches the
one inside the VoteAuthorization
5. the VoteSrv records that the VoteAuthorization has been used (for example
by signing and encrypting it with the AuthMgr public key and writing it to a
file with the same name)
6. the VoteSrv generates a digest of the vote including a precise timestamp and
a random string as the VerificationCode, signs and encrypts with the VoteMgr
public key the vote together with the VerificationCode and writes it in a file
with the same name (that is the name of the file is the VerificationCode)
7. the VoteSrv sends to the voter’s web browser the VerificationCode, the digi-
tal signature of the VerificationCode, the precise timestamp and the random
string. In this way the voter can recompute the VerificationCode and verify
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that it corresponds to her vote. The voter has to keep off-line the Verification-
Code to check that her vote is correctly counted in the results of the ballot.
4.6 Step 6 – Vote counting
This step is done off-line and is composed by:
1. the AuthMgr receives from the AuthSysMgr the signed and encrypted VoteTo-
kens, decrypts them, checks the signatures and records each used VoteToken
together with the time of use and the username which has used it
2. the AuthMgr receives from the AuthSysMgr the signed and encrypted VoteAu-
thorizations created, decrypts them, checks the signatures and makes the list
of created VoteAuthorizations
3. the AuthMgr receives from the VoteSysMgr the signed and encrypted VoteAu-
thorizations used, decrypts them, checks the signatures and makes the list of
used VoteAuthorizations
4. the AuthMgr checks that the two lists of VoteAuthorizations are consistent
(notice that according to the protocol there is no recorded information that
links the VoteTokens to the VoteAuthorizations so that, unless the AuthSys-
Mgr cheats by recording extra information and passing it to the AuthMgr, the
list of used VoteTokens and used VoteAuthorizations are not linked)
5. the VoteMgr receives from the VoteSysMgr the signed and encrypted Votes,
for the moment the VoteMgr does not decrypt them but makes the list of
VerificationCodes (which are the file names)
6. the VoteMgr checks with the AuthMgr that the number of votes is consistent
with the number of valid and used VoteAuthorizations (notice that accord-
ing to the protocol there is no recorded information that links the Votes to
the VoteAuthorizations so that, unless the VoteSysMgr cheats by recording
extra information and passing it to the VoteMgr, the list of Votes and used
VoteAuthorizations are not linked)
7. the AuthMgr publishes the list of used VoteTokens and the timestamp of their
use so that voters can check that the time at which they obtained the VoteAu-
thorization is correct (this is the time at which the voters have authenticated,
not the time of vote); the AuthMgr publishes also the list of VoteTokens which
have not been used, that is of eligible voters who did not vote
8. the VoteMgr publishes the list of VerificationCodes so that voters can check
if their VerificationCode is present in the list; if a voter does not find her
VerificationCode in the list, she must inform the VoteMgr of this before the
votes are decrypted, in this way if there has been a problem in the procedure,
the ballot can be canceled before counting the votes (this step also prevents a
voter to false claim that her VerificationCode is not present if the ballot had
a result she did not like); to report a missing VerificationCode, a voter should
present to the VoteMgr her VerificationCode with its digital signature
Andrea Pasquinucci – A modular eballot system – V0.6 8
9. after the VerificationCodes have been checked by the voters, the VoteMgr
decrypts the signed and encrypted Votes, checks the signatures, makes the list
of Votes and counts them
10. the VoteMgr publishes the list of VerificationCodes and individual Votes so that
voters can check that their votes have been counted correctly, and publishes
the result of the ballot.
5 Security requirements analysis
We now consider the security properties of the protocol just described.
In the following discussion when we say that a system manager cheats by modi-
fying the software so that it does not follow the protocol described, it is equivalent
to the fact that the server has fallen under control of an attacker who can then do
what a system manager can do.
Unreusability: both the VoteToken and the VoteAuthorization can be used only
once, at the AuthSrv and the VoteSrv respectively; the AuthSysMgr could issue
more VoteAuthorization for the same VoteToken, analogously the VoteSysMgr
could allow multiple votes for the same VoteAuthorization, but this is discov-
ered by the cross checking of the number of VoteTokens, VoteAuthorizations
and votes done by the AuthMgr and VoteMgr.
Privacy: the information received by the VoteSrv does not allow the VoteSysMgr
to learn who is casting a vote; privacy can be theoretically violated only if at
least two system managers are cheating:
• if the AuthSysMgr records the connection between the the VoteToken
and the VoteAuthorization and the VoteSysMgr records the connection
between the VoteAuthorization and the Vote, then by combining this in-
formation is possible to know who has voted what
• if the AnonSysMgr records the IP addresses (and tcp ports) of the voter
machine when connecting to the VoteSrv and the time of connection, and
the VoteSysMgr records the connection between the VoteAuthorization
and the Vote and the time of the vote, then by combining this information
is possible to know which client IP has casted a vote and at what time.
Completeness: it is not possible to modify a vote and all votes are counted, so
that it is not possible to force to count the votes in a wrong way.
Soundness: every vote is signed by the AuthSrv and encrypted with the VoteSys-
Mgr public key so that it is not possible to count invalid votes.
Individual verifiability: a verification code is given to each voter to allow to
verify that her vote has been counted correctly.
Weak Eligibility: the AuthSrv verifies that only eligible voters can obtain a VoteAu-
thorization; the VoteSrv checks that the VoteAuthorization has been issued by
the AuthSrv but not directly the voter credentials, thus obtaining the weak
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eligibility requirement; the AuthMgr could issue VoteAuthorizations to non
eligible voters or the VoteMgr could accept non valid VoteAuthorizations, but
the vote counting procedure by the AuthMgr and VoteMgr and the checking
of the public results by the voters will discover it.
6 Threats analysis
Although the protocol guarantees its self-correctness, in practice two factors can
reduce its security:
1. implementation errors (like software bugs)
2. human intervention.
We analyze threats from two points of view: the purpose of the attack and the
system attacked.
6.1 Threat model
An attacker can be interested to
1. influence the final result (system integrity threat)
2. capture information on votes (privacy threat)
6.1.1 System Integrity
System Integrity attacks can be performed by:
1. multiple use of credentials
2. vote modification
• by the VoteSrv
• by network man-in-the-middle attacks
• on the voter’s machine
3. stealing of vote credentials from the AuthSrv.
All of these threats, except for that on the voter’s machine, are mitigated by
countermeasures in the protocol so that any such attempt will be discovered.
The protocol does not have countermeasures against Vote Selling, indeed it lacks
the receipt-freeness property since it bases some of its security properties on the
receipt given to the voter by the VoteSrv. Indeed a voter can prove to a third
party, if she wishes, how she has voted by showing the VerificationCode, or a voter
can pass her voting credentials or VoteAuthorization to someone else and have the
attacker cast directly the vote.
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6.1.2 Privacy
Privacy attacks can be performed
1. by sniffing on the connections between the voter and the servers: this threat
is countered by encrypting all traffic
2. by installing sniffers on the AuthSrv and VoteSrv to record all information:
this threat must be countered by the system managers
3. if at least two system managers collude in violating the system
4. by installing a sniffer on the voter machine: the protocol does not provide any
countermeasure to this threat.
6.2 System vulnerabilities
Attacks by intruders in a system can lead to complete compromise of the machine
so that the attackers takes complete control of it, in other words they are able to
act as the system manager. Notice that we need to trust the system managers and
the correct status of the systems for the protocol to work as stated.
Compromise of the voter machine can lead to the loss of privacy and the pos-
sibility for the attacker to modify the vote (loss of integrity). Voter are able to
recompute their VerificationCodes, and they can discover if their votes have been
modified. (Notice that today this kind of attack is the most likely and easy to
implement.)
Compromise of the AuthSrv can lead to the stealing of vote credentials and loss
of privacy if there is also a compromise of the VoteSrv. These risks are reduced due
to countermeasures in the protocol.
Compromise of the Anonymizer can lead to a loss of privacy if there is also a
compromise of the VoteSrv.
Compromise of the VoteSrv can lead to modification of votes, countermeasures
for this risks are present in the protocol. Compromise of the VoteSrv together with
the compromise of the Anonymizer or AuthSrv can also lead to a loss of privacy.
6.3 Off-line threats
The AuthMgr and VoteMgr must be trusted. If they cheat they can modify the
results of the ballot. In particular:
• the AuthMgr can distribute vote credentials to not eligible voters (no counter-
measures)
• the AuthMgr can give more than one vote credential to the same voter (no
countermeasures)
• the VoteMgr could fabricate votes and add them to the final tally, but this is
discovered by the AuthMgr checking the number of votes w.r.t. the number of
voters and the voters verifying that their votes have been counted correctly
• the VoteMgr can change the votes of the voters, but this is discovered by the
individual checks of the voters.
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6.4 Other threats
6.4.1 Attacks to the VerificationCode
Format of the VerificationCode is crucial to prevent the VoteSysMgr to modify
votes. Assume for example that the VerificationCode is a PRN. In this case the
VoteSysMgr could modify the protocol as follows. Suppose there is a Yes/No ballot
and the VoteSysMgr wants to fix the result for No. The first voter that votes Yes is
processed correctly, all other voters who vote Yes (or enough of them to make No
win) will have their vote changed to No but will receive the same VerificationCode
of the first voter. In this way all Yes voters will have the same VerificationCode
corresponding to a published and correctly counted Yes vote. Only by checking
the VerificationCode among Yes voters it would be possible to discover that they
are all equal, which must not be since they should be PRN. But voters must keep
confidential their VerificationCodes since otherwise the privacy of their votes will
be lost.
For this reason the VerificationCode is a digest of the vote and of the time of
the vote, in such a way that the voter can recompute the digest using as ingredients
her vote and the timestamp.
But a public computable VerificationCode which includes only the vote and a
timestamp is liable to a brute force attack. Indeed the vote and the procedure to
compute the VerificationCode are public and the only missing information is the
timestamp. By computing all VerificationCodes with that vote and all reasonable
timestamps, the attacker can find the correct timestamp. By matching the com-
puted timestamp to the time of the authentication recorded by the AuthSrv and
published by the AuthMgr, the attacker could, in some circumstances, discover the
name of the voter.
To prevent this brute force attack, a sufficiently long random string must be
added to the computation of the VerificationCode. Since the VerificationCode is
nothing else than a cryptographical hash of the vote, the precise timestamp and the
random string, and the voter is asked to verify that the timestamp is correct, it is
not possible for the VoteSysMgr to mount the attack discussed at the beginning of
this section. Indeed if it was possible, it would mean that by adjusting the random
string the VoteSysMgr would be able to construct two different messages (they are
different due to the different timestamps) with the same cryptographical hash. But
this is not possible by definition of a cryptographical hash function.
6.4.2 Human verifiability
In this protocol a large part of the security relies on the behavior of the people
involved, both the managers and officials of the ballot and the voters themselves.
In particular the voters must check that their votes are counted correctly, using
their VerificationCode, to prevent various possible attacks. It is reasonable to think
that most voters who have voted will check their vote. It is less likely that voters
will recompute their VerificationCode since, even if it is a very simple procedure,
this requires a minimum knowledge about cryptography. Thus the re-computation
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of the VerificationCode is something that will be done by experts only. Anyway,
the fact that some voters will do it, will be able, at least statistically, to prevent
some attacks.
One possible attack venue is to consider voters who do not vote. In each ballot
there are always voters that do not cast their vote for many different reasons. It will
be very difficult to convince these voters to check that they correctly appear as not
having voted in the final lists published by the AuthMgr. Assuming that all eligible
voters who do not vote do not check this list, the following attack is possible. The
AuthSysMgr logs in to the AuthSrv a few minutes before the end of the ballot and
gets the list of not used VoteTokens.2 The AuthSysMgr must also have obtained,
for example from the AuthMgr, the list of all username+passwords. With these
data, the AuthSysMgr can vote instead of all the voters who have not voted and
in this way violate the integrity of the ballot. It is still possible to discover this
attack by checking the integrity of the AuthSrv since the AuthSrv must be sealed
during the time of the ballot and all logins to it must be recorded in the logs. In
a correct procedure, the AuthMgr (not the AuthSysMgr) should seal the machine
before the beginning of the ballot and remove the seal at the end of the ballot
but only after having checked that nobody has logged in the machine during the
ballot and no breach of security have happened. (If the AuthSysMgr has installed
a program which notifies him of the not used VoteTokens, then the machine is not
secure to start with.) Thus it is possible to discover this attack even if all eligible
voters who do not vote do not check the list of voters, but it requires a very careful
implementation of the procedures, both human and automatic.
Always considering the voters who do not vote, since the authentication is auto-
matically done by the AuthSrv, if a voter complains that she has not voted but her
VoteToken appears in the list of the used ones, the AuthMgr has to understand what
really has happened. There are a few possibilities and among them the following
• someone has stolen the voting credentials of the voter and, knowing that the
voter would have not used them, has voted in her place
• the voter has sold (or has been forced to sell) her voting credentials but now
is trying to get the ballot cancelled
• a violation of the AuthSrv has happened, as described before, and unsed voting
credentials have been used by attackers
• there has been an error in the procedures, for example in the listing and count-
ing of votes and VoteTokens
• the voter has in reality casted her ballot, but has decided to try to cancel
the ballot without even knowing the result (in this case is the voter who is
cheating).
It is up to the ballot officials to understand what has really happened and decide
if the results of the ballot are correct or there has been some violations.
2Actually on the AuthSrv there are only the Hash of the VoteTokens, so the AuthSysMgr must also have
obtained, for example from the AuthMgr, the original list of VoteTokens.
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7 Conclusions
The effectiveness and security of the protocol are based on
• trust in the people involved in the protocol: they must not collude against the
protocol
• absence of bugs in software which could render insecure the implementation of
the protocol: from operating system to libraries and applications
• systems correctly managed and in integral state: absence of worms, viruses,
trojans, rootkits etc. on all systems involved, included the voter’s machine.
Under these conditions we believe that our protocol can be practically imple-
mented and can deliver a web based balloting system with much higher security
than those currently commercially available.
Appendix A
In ref. [2] was proposed a protocol similar to ours but based on blind signatures [4].
Our protocol can be easily modified to support blind signatures.
The main implementational difference between our protocol and a version using
blind signatures is that the VoteAuthorization is not created by the AuthSrv but
by the voter’s client proxy (blind signatures are not possible with current web
browsers).
The procedure in Step 3 is then modified as follows:
1. the voter connects to the AuthSrv with her web browser through the client
proxy, checks the fingerprints of the server digital certificate and is authenti-
cated using username+password and/or client digital certificate
2. the voter creates a PRN (not unique, so there is a very small chance that two
voters will create the same PRN in which case only one of them will be able
to vote; the probability of this depends on the space of the PRN w.r.t. the
number of voters), prepares a blind signature of it and sends to the AuthSrv
the blind signature and the VoteToken
3. the AuthSrv checks the VoteToken and does the blind signature, that is digi-
tally signs the encrypted PRN without knowing the value of the PRN
4. the AuthSrv records that the VoteToken has been used (for example by sign-
ing and encrypting it together with the current time and username with the
AuthMgr public key and writing it to a file with the same name)
5. the AuthSrv sends the blind signature to the voter who extracts the signed
PRN which is her VoteAuthorization.
In this case the AuthSrv does not know and cannot compute the VoteAuthoriza-
tion, so even if the AuthSysMgr would collude with the VoteSysMgr, they will not
be able to obtain information on which voter has which VoteAuthorization. On the
other hand, if blind signatures are used there is the (possibly small) risk that two
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voters will create the same VoteAuthorization and one of them will be prevented
from voting.
Afterwords in the protocol, in step 5, the client-proxy encrypts the VoteAutho-
rization with the public key of the VoteSrv before sending it. Thus the AuthMgr
should provide the voter together with the voting credentials also with the public
key of the VoteSrv.
To introduce blind signatures in our protocol, it is then sufficient for the voter to
use a client proxy and to modify accordingly the AuthSrv. The rest of the protocol
does not change.
The protocol with blind signatures has the advantage of eliminating the possibil-
ity of collusion between the AuthSysMgr and the VoteSysMgr to violate the privacy
of the voters. On the other side, if blind signatures are used, it is not possible to
guarantee that all eligible voters can vote. For this reason, the protocol proposed
in ref. [2] was called a polling protocol in which statistical, but not exact, results
are obtained.
Notice also that blind signatures can not be implemented with current web
browsers. Thus implementing practically the protocol with blind signatures to-
day is technically more complicated because it requires designing, realizing and
maintaining a program which should run on every voter’s machine.
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